PHP 5.4.45 + security fix from 5.5.36

7 files changed, 492 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/bug71331.patch b/bug71331.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0151693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug71331.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+Backported from 5.5 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+binary patch dropped
+
+
+From 9649ca1630433473a307d015ba1a79a4a7a779f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 22:58:40 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Fixed bug #71331 - Uninitialized pointer in
+ phar_make_dirstream()
+
+---
+ ext/phar/dirstream.c         |   3 ++-
+ ext/phar/tar.c               |   2 +-
+ ext/phar/tests/bug71331.phpt |  15 +++++++++++++++
+ ext/phar/tests/bug71331.tar  | Bin 0 -> 2560 bytes
+ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ext/phar/tests/bug71331.phpt
+ create mode 100644 ext/phar/tests/bug71331.tar
+
+diff --git a/ext/phar/dirstream.c b/ext/phar/dirstream.c
+index 75cf049..94958a2 100644
+--- a/ext/phar/dirstream.c
++++ b/ext/phar/dirstream.c
+@@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ static php_stream *phar_make_dirstream(c
+ 	zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(manifest);
+ 
+ 	while (FAILURE != zend_hash_has_more_elements(manifest)) {
++		keylen = 0;
+ 		if (HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTANT == zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(manifest, &key, &keylen, &unused, 0, NULL)) {
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ static php_stream *phar_make_dirstream(c
+ 		PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
+ 
+ 		if (keylen <= (uint)dirlen) {
+-			if (keylen < (uint)dirlen || !strncmp(str_key, dir, dirlen)) {
++			if (keylen == 0 || keylen < (uint)dirlen || !strncmp(str_key, dir, dirlen)) {
+ 				PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
+ 				if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_move_forward(manifest)) {
+ 					break;
+diff --git a/ext/phar/tar.c b/ext/phar/tar.c
+index 3a4bd49..bf19e08 100644
+--- a/ext/phar/tar.c
++++ b/ext/phar/tar.c
+@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ bail:
+ 			entry.filename_len = entry.uncompressed_filesize;
+ 
+ 			/* Check for overflow - bug 61065 */
+-			if (entry.filename_len == UINT_MAX) {
++			if (entry.filename_len == UINT_MAX || entry.filename_len == 0) {
+ 				if (error) {
+ 					spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: \"%s\" is a corrupted tar file (invalid entry size)", fname);
+ 				}
+
diff --git a/bug72114.patch b/bug72114.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e9eca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72114.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+Backported from 5.5 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From abd159cce48f3e34f08e4751c568e09677d5ec9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 21:55:29 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
+
+---
+ ext/standard/file.c                   |  6 ++++++
+ ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/file.c b/ext/standard/file.c
+index 0abc022..e39c84f 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/file.c
++++ b/ext/standard/file.c
+@@ -1755,6 +1755,12 @@ PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(fread)
+ 		RETURN_FALSE;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (len > INT_MAX) {
++		/* string length is int in 5.x so we can not read more than int */
++		php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Length parameter must be no more than %d", INT_MAX);
++		RETURN_FALSE;
++	}
++
+ 	Z_STRVAL_P(return_value) = emalloc(len + 1);
+ 	Z_STRLEN_P(return_value) = php_stream_read(stream, Z_STRVAL_P(return_value), len);
+ 
+diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..5e591ee
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72114 (Integer underflow / arbitrary null write in fread/gzread)
++--FILE--
++<?php
++ini_set('memory_limit', "2500M");
++$fp = fopen("/dev/zero", "r");
++fread($fp, 2147483648);
++?>
++Done
++--EXPECTF--
++Warning: fread(): Length parameter must be no more than 2147483647 in %s/bug72114.php on line %d
++Done
+
+
+From 4dd03651f3c90a754600e9b76e33c9481bd9e720 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Remi Collet <remi@php.net>
+Date: Wed, 25 May 2016 16:17:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Skip test which is 64bits only
+
+Diff from test output
+001+ Warning: fread(): Length parameter must be greater than 0 in ...
+001- Warning: fread(): Length parameter must be no more than 2147483647 in ...
+---
+ ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt b/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt
+index 5e591ee..3cd03fd 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt
++++ b/ext/standard/tests/file/bug72114.phpt
+@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
+ --TEST--
+ Bug #72114 (Integer underflow / arbitrary null write in fread/gzread)
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php if (PHP_INT_SIZE != 8) die("skip this test is for 64bit platform only"); ?>
+ --FILE--
+ <?php
+ ini_set('memory_limit', "2500M");
diff --git a/bug72135.patch b/bug72135.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0fc85d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72135.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+Backported from 5.5 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 0da8b8b801f9276359262f1ef8274c7812d3dfda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Sun, 15 May 2016 23:26:51 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside
+ int range
+
+---
+ ext/standard/html.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/html.c b/ext/standard/html.c
+index 72423b5..81d8aff 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/html.c
++++ b/ext/standard/html.c
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_next_char(
+ 					else
+ 						MB_FAILURE(pos, 4);
+ 				}
+-				
++
+ 				this_char = ((c & 0x07) << 18) | ((str[pos + 1] & 0x3f) << 12) | ((str[pos + 2] & 0x3f) << 6) | (str[pos + 3] & 0x3f);
+ 				if (this_char < 0x10000 || this_char > 0x10FFFF) { /* non-shortest form or outside range */
+ 					MB_FAILURE(pos, 4);
+@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
+ 
+ 	if (charset_hint) {
+ 		int found = 0;
+-		
++
+ 		/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
+ 		for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
+ 			if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
+@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static inline unsigned char unimap_bsearch(const uni_to_enc *table, unsigned cod
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	code_key = (unsigned short) code_key_a;
+-	
++
+ 	while (l <= h) {
+ 		m = l + (h - l) / 2;
+ 		if (code_key < m->un_code_point)
+@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static inline int map_from_unicode(unsigned code, enum entity_charset charset, u
+ 		/* identity mapping of code points to unicode */
+ 		if (code > 0xFF) {
+ 			return FAILURE;
+-		} 
++		}
+ 		*res = code;
+ 		break;
+ 
+@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ static inline int map_from_unicode(unsigned code, enum entity_charset charset, u
+ 			return FAILURE;
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+-		
++
+ 	case cs_8859_15:
+ 		if (code < 0xA4 || (code > 0xBE && code <= 0xFF)) {
+ 			*res = code;
+@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ static inline int map_from_unicode(unsigned code, enum entity_charset charset, u
+ 	case cs_cp866:
+ 		table = unimap_cp866;
+ 		table_size = sizeof(unimap_cp866) / sizeof(*unimap_cp866);
+-		
++
+ table_over_7F:
+ 		if (code <= 0x7F) {
+ 			*res = code;
+@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static inline int unicode_cp_is_allowed(unsigned uni_cp, int document_type)
+ 	 * Not sure this is the relevant part for HTML 5, though. I opted to
+ 	 * disallow the characters that would result in a parse error when
+ 	 * preprocessing of the input stream. See also section 8.1.3.
+-	 * 
++	 *
+ 	 * It's unclear if XHTML 1.0 allows C1 characters. I'll opt to apply to
+ 	 * XHTML 1.0 the same rules as for XML 1.0.
+ 	 * See <http://cmsmcq.com/2007/C1.xml>.
+@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static inline int numeric_entity_is_allowed(unsigned uni_cp, int document_type)
+ /* {{{ process_numeric_entity
+  * Auxiliary function to traverse_for_entities.
+  * On input, *buf should point to the first character after # and on output, it's the last
+- * byte read, no matter if there was success or insuccess. 
++ * byte read, no matter if there was success or insuccess.
+  */
+ static inline int process_numeric_entity(const char **buf, unsigned *code_point)
+ {
+@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static inline int process_numeric_entity(const char **buf, unsigned *code_point)
+ 
+ 	if (hexadecimal && (**buf != '\0'))
+ 		(*buf)++;
+-			
++
+ 	/* strtol allows whitespace and other stuff in the beginning
+ 		* we're not interested */
+ 	if ((hexadecimal && !isxdigit(**buf)) ||
+@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@ static void traverse_for_entities(
+ 				goto invalid_code;
+ 
+ 			/* are we allowed to decode this entity in this document type?
+-			 * HTML 5 is the only that has a character that cannot be used in 
++			 * HTML 5 is the only that has a character that cannot be used in
+ 			 * a numeric entity but is allowed literally (U+000D). The
+ 			 * unoptimized version would be ... || !numeric_entity_is_allowed(code) */
+ 			if (!unicode_cp_is_allowed(code, doctype) ||
+@@ -996,9 +996,9 @@ static void traverse_for_entities(
+ 				}
+ 			}
+ 		}
+-		
++
+ 		assert(*next == ';');
+-		
++
+ 		if (((code == '\'' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_SINGLE)) ||
+ 				(code == '"' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_DOUBLE)))
+ 				/* && code2 == '\0' always true for current maps */)
+@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ static void traverse_for_entities(
+ 			*(q++) = *p;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	
++
+ 	*q = '\0';
+ 	*retlen = (size_t)(q - ret);
+ }
+@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static entity_table_opt determine_entity_table(int all, int doctype)
+ 	entity_table_opt retval = {NULL};
+ 
+ 	assert(!(doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1 && all));
+-	
++
+ 	if (all) {
+ 		retval.ms_table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5) ?
+ 			entity_ms_table_html5 : entity_ms_table_html4;
+@@ -1111,13 +1111,13 @@ PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_
+ 	if (retlen == 0) {
+ 		goto empty_source;
+ 	}
+-	
++
+ 	inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
+-	
++
+ 	/* replace numeric entities */
+ 	traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
+ 
+-empty_source:	
++empty_source:
+ 	*newlen = retlen;
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static inline void find_entity_for_char(
+ {
+ 	unsigned stage1_idx = ENT_STAGE1_INDEX(k);
+ 	const entity_stage3_row *c;
+-	
++
+ 	if (stage1_idx > 0x1D) {
+ 		*entity     = NULL;
+ 		*entity_len = 0;
+@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ static inline void find_entity_for_char(
+ 		if (!(*cursor < oldlen))
+ 			goto no_suitable_2nd;
+ 
+-		next_char = get_next_char(charset, old, oldlen, cursor, &status); 
++		next_char = get_next_char(charset, old, oldlen, cursor, &status);
+ 
+ 		if (status == FAILURE)
+ 			goto no_suitable_2nd;
+@@ -1187,7 +1187,7 @@ static inline void find_entity_for_char(
+ 		*entity = (const unsigned char *)
+ 			c->data.multicodepoint_table[0].leading_entry.default_entity;
+ 		*entity_len = c->data.multicodepoint_table[0].leading_entry.default_entity_len;
+-	}	
++	}
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+ 
+@@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ PHPAPI char *php_escape_html_entities_ex(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size
+ 
+ 	/* initial estimate */
+ 	if (oldlen < 64) {
+-		maxlen = 128;	
++		maxlen = 128;
+ 	} else {
+ 		maxlen = 2 * oldlen;
+ 		if (maxlen < oldlen) {
+@@ -1444,6 +1444,10 @@ static void php_html_entities(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int all)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	replaced = php_escape_html_entities_ex(str, str_len, &new_len, all, (int) flags, hint_charset, double_encode TSRMLS_CC);
++	if (new_len > INT_MAX) {
++		efree(replaced);
++		RETURN_FALSE;
++	}
+ 	RETVAL_STRINGL(replaced, (int)new_len, 0);
+ }
+ /* }}} */
+@@ -1577,7 +1581,7 @@ static inline void write_s3row_data(
+ 			} else {
+ 				spe_cp = uni_cp;
+ 			}
+-			
++
+ 			written_k2 = write_octet_sequence(&key[written_k1], charset, spe_cp);
+ 			memcpy(&entity[1], mcpr[i].normal_entry.entity, l);
+ 			entity[l + 1] = ';';
+@@ -1615,7 +1619,7 @@ PHP_FUNCTION(get_html_translation_table)
+ 	LIMIT_ALL(all, doctype, charset);
+ 
+ 	array_init(return_value);
+-	
++
+ 	entity_table = determine_entity_table(all, doctype);
+ 	if (all && !CHARSET_UNICODE_COMPAT(charset)) {
+ 		to_uni_table = enc_to_uni_index[charset];
+
+
+From e9559131152ab0fa89737db11ebe8f43e1435b96 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Tue, 24 May 2016 15:52:15 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Better fix for bug #72135
+
+---
+ ext/standard/html.c | 9 +++++----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/ext/standard/html.c b/ext/standard/html.c
+index 81d8aff..c5fd4b8 100644
+--- a/ext/standard/html.c
++++ b/ext/standard/html.c
+@@ -1423,6 +1423,11 @@ PHPAPI char *php_escape_html_entities_ex(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size
+ 	}
+ 	replaced[len] = '\0';
+ 	*newlen = len;
++	if(len > INT_MAX) {
++		zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Escaped string is too long");
++		efree(replaced);
++		return NULL;
++	}
+ 
+ 	return replaced;
+ }
+@@ -1444,10 +1449,6 @@ static void php_html_entities(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int all)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	replaced = php_escape_html_entities_ex(str, str_len, &new_len, all, (int) flags, hint_charset, double_encode TSRMLS_CC);
+-	if (new_len > INT_MAX) {
+-		efree(replaced);
+-		RETURN_FALSE;
+-	}
+ 	RETVAL_STRINGL(replaced, (int)new_len, 0);
+ }
+ /* }}} */
diff --git a/bug72241.patch b/bug72241.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4b5492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bug72241.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+Backported from 5.5 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 97eff7eb57fc2320c267a949cffd622c38712484 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 17:49:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
+
+---
+ ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c | 235 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ ext/intl/tests/bug72241.phpt     |  14 +++
+ 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 ext/intl/tests/bug72241.phpt
+
+diff --git a/ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c b/ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c
+index c8159bc..31f60b3 100644
+--- a/ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c
++++ b/ext/intl/locale/locale_methods.c
+@@ -329,6 +329,7 @@ static char* get_icu_value_internal( const char* loc_name , char* tag_name, int*
+ 		if( U_FAILURE( status ) ) {
+ 			if( status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR ) {
+ 				status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
++				buflen++; /* add space for \0 */
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+ 
+diff --git a/ext/intl/tests/bug72241.phpt b/ext/intl/tests/bug72241.phpt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..397e1e7
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/ext/intl/tests/bug72241.phpt
+@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
++--TEST--
++Bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
++--SKIPIF--
++<?php if( !extension_loaded( 'intl' ) ) print 'skip'; ?>
++--FILE--
++<?php
++$var1=str_repeat("A", 1000);
++$out = locale_get_primary_language($var1);
++echo strlen($out) . PHP_EOL;
++echo unpack('H*', $out)[1] . PHP_EOL;
++--EXPECT--
++1000
++61616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161616161
++
diff --git a/bugoverflow.patch b/bugoverflow.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e803c53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bugoverflow.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+Backported from 5.5 for 5.4 by Remi Collet
+
+
+From 41fc3c76e97a36ff3b505da7d704ca17bb171fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Stanislav Malyshev <stas@php.net>
+Date: Mon, 9 May 2016 22:17:20 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Add check for string overflow to all string add operations
+
+---
+ Zend/zend_operators.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/Zend/zend_operators.c b/Zend/zend_operators.c
+index e0812fc..2f1394f 100644
+--- a/Zend/zend_operators.c
++++ b/Zend/zend_operators.c
+@@ -1199,6 +1199,10 @@ ZEND_API int add_char_to_string(zval *result, const zval *op1, const zval *op2)
+ 	int length = Z_STRLEN_P(op1) + 1;
+ 	char *buf;
+ 
++	if (UNEXPECTED(length < 0)) {
++		zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++	}
++
+ 	if (IS_INTERNED(Z_STRVAL_P(op1))) {
+ 		buf = (char *) emalloc(length + 1);
+ 		memcpy(buf, Z_STRVAL_P(op1), Z_STRLEN_P(op1));
+@@ -1218,6 +1222,9 @@ ZEND_API int add_string_to_string(zval *result, const zval *op1, const zval *op2
+ 	int length = Z_STRLEN_P(op1) + Z_STRLEN_P(op2);
+ 	char *buf;
+ 
++	if (UNEXPECTED(length < 0)) {
++		zend_error(E_ERROR, "String size overflow");
++	}
+ 	if (IS_INTERNED(Z_STRVAL_P(op1))) {
+ 		buf = (char *) emalloc(length+1);
+ 		memcpy(buf, Z_STRVAL_P(op1), Z_STRLEN_P(op1));
diff --git a/failed.txt b/failed.txt
index 3825890..9d57fb8 100644
--- a/failed.txt
+++ b/failed.txt
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-===== 5.5.45-8 (2016-04-27)
+===== 5.5.45-9 (2016-05-29)
 
 $ grep -r 'Tests failed' /var/lib/mock/*/build.log
 
diff --git a/php54.spec b/php54.spec
index 4e2fe94..d5982c5 100644
--- a/php54.spec
+++ b/php54.spec
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
 Summary: PHP scripting language for creating dynamic web sites
 Name: php
 Version: 5.4.45
-Release: 8%{?dist}
+Release: 9%{?dist}
 # All files licensed under PHP version 3.01, except
 # Zend is licensed under Zend
 # TSRM is licensed under BSD
@@ -183,6 +183,11 @@ Patch223: bug72061.patch
 Patch224: bug72093.patch
 Patch225: bug72094.patch
 Patch226: bug72099.patch
+Patch227: bug71331.patch
+Patch228: bug72114.patch
+Patch229: bugoverflow.patch
+Patch230: bug72135.patch
+Patch231: bug72241.patch
 
 # Fixes for tests
 # no_NO issue
@@ -917,6 +922,11 @@ rm -f ext/json/utf8_to_utf16.*
 %patch224 -p1 -b .bug72093
 %patch225 -p1 -b .bug72094
 %patch226 -p1 -b .bug72099
+%patch227 -p1 -b .bug71331
+%patch228 -p1 -b .bug72114
+%patch229 -p1 -b .bugoverflow
+%patch230 -p1 -b .bug72135
+%patch231 -p1 -b .bug72241
 
 # Fixes for tests
 %patch301 -p1 -b .datetests2
@@ -1806,6 +1816,17 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
+* Sun May 29 2016 Remi Collet <remi@fedoraproject.org> 5.4.45-9
+- Fix #71331: Uninitialized pointer in phar_make_dirstream
+  CVE-2016-4343
+- Fix #72114: int/size_t confusion in fread
+  CVE-2016-5096
+- Add check for string overflow to all string add operations
+- Fix #72135: don't create strings with lengths outside int range
+  CVE-2016-5094
+- Fix #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
+  CVE-2016-5093
+
 * Tue Apr 26 2016 Remi Collet <remi@fedoraproject.org> 5.4.45-8
 - Fix #64938: libxml_disable_entity_loader setting is shared between threads
   CVE-2015-8866