diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'php-ghsa-76gg-c692-v2mw.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | php-ghsa-76gg-c692-v2mw.patch | 123 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 123 deletions
diff --git a/php-ghsa-76gg-c692-v2mw.patch b/php-ghsa-76gg-c692-v2mw.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 8fe3de7..0000000 --- a/php-ghsa-76gg-c692-v2mw.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,123 +0,0 @@ -From 0cfca9aa1395271833848daec0bace51d965531d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Niels Dossche <7771979+nielsdos@users.noreply.github.com> -Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2023 15:05:03 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix missing randomness check and insufficient random bytes - for SOAP HTTP Digest -MIME-Version: 1.0 -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit - -If php_random_bytes_throw fails, the nonce will be uninitialized, but -still sent to the server. The client nonce is intended to protect -against a malicious server. See section 5.10 and 5.12 of RFC 7616 [1], -and bullet point 2 below. - -Tim pointed out that even though it's the MD5 of the nonce that gets sent, -enumerating 31 bits is trivial. So we have still a stack information leak -of 31 bits. - -Furthermore, Tim found the following issues: -* The small size of cnonce might cause the server to erroneously reject - a request due to a repeated (cnonce, nc) pair. As per the birthday - problem 31 bits of randomness will return a duplication with 50% - chance after less than 55000 requests and nc always starts counting at 1. -* The cnonce is intended to protect the client and password against a - malicious server that returns a constant server nonce where the server - precomputed a rainbow table between passwords and correct client response. - As storage is fairly cheap, a server could precompute the client responses - for (a subset of) client nonces and still have a chance of reversing the - client response with the same probability as the cnonce duplication. - - Precomputing the rainbow table for all 2^31 cnonces increases the rainbow - table size by factor 2 billion, which is infeasible. But precomputing it - for 2^14 cnonces only increases the table size by factor 16k and the server - would still have a 10% chance of successfully reversing a password with a - single client request. - -This patch fixes the issues by increasing the nonce size, and checking -the return value of php_random_bytes_throw(). In the process we also get -rid of the MD5 hashing of the nonce. - -[1] RFC 7616: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7616 - -Co-authored-by: Tim Düsterhus <timwolla@php.net> -(cherry picked from commit 126d517ce240e9f638d9a5eaa509eaca49ef562a) ---- - NEWS | 6 ++++++ - ext/soap/php_http.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- - 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS -index 3f8739eae7..7c07635cad 100644 ---- a/NEWS -+++ b/NEWS -@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@ - PHP NEWS - ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| - -+Backported from 8.0.29 -+ -+- Soap: -+ . Fixed bug GHSA-76gg-c692-v2mw (Missing error check and insufficient random -+ bytes in HTTP Digest authentication for SOAP). (nielsdos, timwolla) -+ - Backported from 8.0.28 - - - Core: -diff --git a/ext/soap/php_http.c b/ext/soap/php_http.c -index ee3dcbdc9a..e3a9afdbe9 100644 ---- a/ext/soap/php_http.c -+++ b/ext/soap/php_http.c -@@ -666,18 +666,23 @@ int make_http_soap_request(zval *this_ptr, - if ((digest = zend_hash_str_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest")-1)) != NULL) { - if (Z_TYPE_P(digest) == IS_ARRAY) { - char HA1[33], HA2[33], response[33], cnonce[33], nc[9]; -- zend_long nonce; -+ unsigned char nonce[16]; - PHP_MD5_CTX md5ctx; - unsigned char hash[16]; - -- php_random_bytes_throw(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); -- nonce &= 0x7fffffff; -+ if (UNEXPECTED(php_random_bytes_throw(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)) != SUCCESS)) { -+ ZEND_ASSERT(EG(exception)); -+ php_stream_close(stream); -+ zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpurl", sizeof("httpurl")-1); -+ zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "httpsocket", sizeof("httpsocket")-1); -+ zend_hash_str_del(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_use_proxy", sizeof("_use_proxy")-1); -+ smart_str_free(&soap_headers_z); -+ smart_str_free(&soap_headers); -+ return FALSE; -+ } - -- PHP_MD5Init(&md5ctx); -- snprintf(cnonce, sizeof(cnonce), ZEND_LONG_FMT, nonce); -- PHP_MD5Update(&md5ctx, (unsigned char*)cnonce, strlen(cnonce)); -- PHP_MD5Final(hash, &md5ctx); -- make_digest(cnonce, hash); -+ php_hash_bin2hex(cnonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); -+ cnonce[32] = 0; - - if ((tmp = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(digest), "nc", sizeof("nc")-1)) != NULL && - Z_TYPE_P(tmp) == IS_LONG) { -From 40439039c224bb8cdebd1b7b3d03b8cc11e7cce7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Remi Collet <remi@remirepo.net> -Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 18:05:22 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix GH-11382 add missing hash header for bin2hex - ---- - ext/soap/php_http.c | 1 + - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) - -diff --git a/ext/soap/php_http.c b/ext/soap/php_http.c -index e3a9afdbe9..912b8e341d 100644 ---- a/ext/soap/php_http.c -+++ b/ext/soap/php_http.c -@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ - #include "ext/standard/base64.h" - #include "ext/standard/md5.h" - #include "ext/standard/php_random.h" -+#include "ext/hash/php_hash.h" - - static char *get_http_header_value_nodup(char *headers, char *type, size_t *len); - static char *get_http_header_value(char *headers, char *type); |