From 3a7fae97dc994e8a1ac5f2253527c7b76c86e8be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Remi Collet Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2013 12:53:53 +0100 Subject: curl: sync with 7.27.0-7 from F18 --- 0002-curl-7.27.0-f05e5136.patch | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 197 insertions(+) create mode 100644 0002-curl-7.27.0-f05e5136.patch (limited to '0002-curl-7.27.0-f05e5136.patch') diff --git a/0002-curl-7.27.0-f05e5136.patch b/0002-curl-7.27.0-f05e5136.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7413ed6 --- /dev/null +++ b/0002-curl-7.27.0-f05e5136.patch @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@ +From ce515e993fe7bc7e95549317fe5180b196454d4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka +Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2012 16:06:18 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] ssh: move the fingerprint checking code to a separate fnc + +--- + lib/ssh.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- + 1 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ssh.c b/lib/ssh.c +index c76a48e..4455d44 100644 +--- a/lib/ssh.c ++++ b/lib/ssh.c +@@ -635,6 +635,43 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct connectdata *conn) + return result; + } + ++static bool ssh_check_fingerprint(struct connectdata *conn) ++{ ++ struct ssh_conn *sshc = &conn->proto.sshc; ++ struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; ++ const char *pubkey_md5 = data->set.str[STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5]; ++ char md5buffer[33]; ++ int i; ++ ++ const char *fingerprint = libssh2_hostkey_hash(sshc->ssh_session, ++ LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_MD5); ++ ++ /* The fingerprint points to static storage (!), don't free() it. */ ++ for(i = 0; i < 16; i++) ++ snprintf(&md5buffer[i*2], 3, "%02x", (unsigned char) fingerprint[i]); ++ infof(data, "SSH MD5 fingerprint: %s\n", md5buffer); ++ ++ /* Before we authenticate we check the hostkey's MD5 fingerprint ++ * against a known fingerprint, if available. ++ */ ++ if(pubkey_md5 && strlen(pubkey_md5) == 32) { ++ if(!strequal(md5buffer, pubkey_md5)) { ++ failf(data, ++ "Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch md5 fingerprint. " ++ "Remote %s is not equal to %s", md5buffer, pubkey_md5); ++ state(conn, SSH_SESSION_FREE); ++ sshc->actualcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; ++ return sshc->actualcode; ++ } ++ else { ++ infof(data, "MD5 checksum match!\n"); ++ /* as we already matched, we skip the check for known hosts */ ++ return CURLE_OK; ++ } ++ } ++ else ++ return ssh_knownhost(conn); ++} + + /* + * ssh_statemach_act() runs the SSH state machine as far as it can without +@@ -650,10 +687,8 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn, bool *block) + struct SSHPROTO *sftp_scp = data->state.proto.ssh; + struct ssh_conn *sshc = &conn->proto.sshc; + curl_socket_t sock = conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET]; +- const char *fingerprint; +- char md5buffer[33]; + char *new_readdir_line; +- int rc = LIBSSH2_ERROR_NONE, i; ++ int rc = LIBSSH2_ERROR_NONE; + int err; + int seekerr = CURL_SEEKFUNC_OK; + *block = 0; /* we're not blocking by default */ +@@ -694,35 +729,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn, bool *block) + * against our known hosts. How that is handled (reading from file, + * whatever) is up to us. + */ +- fingerprint = libssh2_hostkey_hash(sshc->ssh_session, +- LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_MD5); +- +- /* The fingerprint points to static storage (!), don't free() it. */ +- for(i = 0; i < 16; i++) +- snprintf(&md5buffer[i*2], 3, "%02x", (unsigned char) fingerprint[i]); +- infof(data, "SSH MD5 fingerprint: %s\n", md5buffer); +- +- /* Before we authenticate we check the hostkey's MD5 fingerprint +- * against a known fingerprint, if available. +- */ +- if(data->set.str[STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5] && +- strlen(data->set.str[STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5]) == 32) { +- if(!strequal(md5buffer, +- data->set.str[STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5])) { +- failf(data, +- "Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch md5 fingerprint. " +- "Remote %s is not equal to %s", +- md5buffer, data->set.str[STRING_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5]); +- state(conn, SSH_SESSION_FREE); +- result = sshc->actualcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; +- } +- else +- infof(data, "MD5 checksum match!\n"); +- /* as we already matched, we skip the check for known hosts */ +- } +- else +- result = ssh_knownhost(conn); +- ++ result = ssh_check_fingerprint(conn); + if(!result) + state(conn, SSH_AUTHLIST); + break; +-- +1.7.1 + + +From f05e51362f310cb04b0ad8d086b9cf693aad5c9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Kamil Dudka +Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2012 16:18:36 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] ssh: do not crash if MD5 fingerprint is not provided by libssh2 + +The MD5 fingerprint cannot be computed when running in FIPS mode. +--- + lib/ssh.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- + 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ssh.c b/lib/ssh.c +index 4455d44..466566c 100644 +--- a/lib/ssh.c ++++ b/lib/ssh.c +@@ -646,19 +646,25 @@ static bool ssh_check_fingerprint(struct connectdata *conn) + const char *fingerprint = libssh2_hostkey_hash(sshc->ssh_session, + LIBSSH2_HOSTKEY_HASH_MD5); + +- /* The fingerprint points to static storage (!), don't free() it. */ +- for(i = 0; i < 16; i++) +- snprintf(&md5buffer[i*2], 3, "%02x", (unsigned char) fingerprint[i]); +- infof(data, "SSH MD5 fingerprint: %s\n", md5buffer); ++ if(fingerprint) { ++ /* The fingerprint points to static storage (!), don't free() it. */ ++ for(i = 0; i < 16; i++) ++ snprintf(&md5buffer[i*2], 3, "%02x", (unsigned char) fingerprint[i]); ++ infof(data, "SSH MD5 fingerprint: %s\n", md5buffer); ++ } + + /* Before we authenticate we check the hostkey's MD5 fingerprint + * against a known fingerprint, if available. + */ + if(pubkey_md5 && strlen(pubkey_md5) == 32) { +- if(!strequal(md5buffer, pubkey_md5)) { +- failf(data, +- "Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch md5 fingerprint. " +- "Remote %s is not equal to %s", md5buffer, pubkey_md5); ++ if(!fingerprint || !strequal(md5buffer, pubkey_md5)) { ++ if(fingerprint) ++ failf(data, ++ "Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch md5 fingerprint. " ++ "Remote %s is not equal to %s", md5buffer, pubkey_md5); ++ else ++ failf(data, ++ "Denied establishing ssh session: md5 fingerprint not available"); + state(conn, SSH_SESSION_FREE); + sshc->actualcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; + return sshc->actualcode; +-- +1.7.1 + + +From 1ab6c353635760e8e25bacc13ae0cab2f97f7338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marc Hoersken +Date: Fri, 14 Sep 2012 14:48:55 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] ssh.c: Fixed warning: implicit conversion from enumeration type + +Signed-off-by: Kamil Dudka +--- + lib/ssh.c | 4 ++-- + 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/ssh.c b/lib/ssh.c +index 466566c..e8b7172 100644 +--- a/lib/ssh.c ++++ b/lib/ssh.c +@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_knownhost(struct connectdata *conn) + return result; + } + +-static bool ssh_check_fingerprint(struct connectdata *conn) ++static CURLcode ssh_check_fingerprint(struct connectdata *conn) + { + struct ssh_conn *sshc = &conn->proto.sshc; + struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data; +@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ static CURLcode ssh_statemach_act(struct connectdata *conn, bool *block) + * whatever) is up to us. + */ + result = ssh_check_fingerprint(conn); +- if(!result) ++ if(result == CURLE_OK) + state(conn, SSH_AUTHLIST); + break; + +-- +1.7.1 + -- cgit